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19-Mar-2020 16:28

Whether Plato held that other ideas exist in God as in their proper dwelling-place is not quite clear.

Aristotle so interpreted Plato ; and it is very likely that Aristotle was better qualified to understand Plato's meaning than were subsequent philosophers who have disputed his interpretation.

Plato According to Plato, in the objective order corresponding to our thought, there are two different worlds: the world of things, and the incomparably higher, nobler world of ideas, which transcends the world of things.

The objects corresponding directly to our universal concepts are not things, but ideas.

"Good" is one of those primary ideas which cannot be strictly defined.

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In Greek philosophy no topic receives more attention than the nature of the good.

The series of means and ends either stretches out indefinitely, or it must terminate in some desired object or objects which are ends in themselves.

Again we sometimes call a thing good because it possesses completely, or in a high degree, the perfections proper to its nature, as a good painting, good respiration.

Sometimes, too, things are termed good because they are of a nature to produce something desirable; that is, they are good casually.

Finally, we speak of good conduct, a good man, a good intention, and here the adjective has for us a sense different from any of the foregoing, unless indeed, we are utilitarian philosophers, to whom morally good is but another term for useful.

In Greek philosophy no topic receives more attention than the nature of the good.

The series of means and ends either stretches out indefinitely, or it must terminate in some desired object or objects which are ends in themselves.

Again we sometimes call a thing good because it possesses completely, or in a high degree, the perfections proper to its nature, as a good painting, good respiration.

Sometimes, too, things are termed good because they are of a nature to produce something desirable; that is, they are good casually.

Finally, we speak of good conduct, a good man, a good intention, and here the adjective has for us a sense different from any of the foregoing, unless indeed, we are utilitarian philosophers, to whom morally good is but another term for useful.

The objective idea is not indwelling in the essences of those things which fall within the scope of our corresponding universal concept, but the thing borrows or derives something from the idea.